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because of intoxication but nevertheless 
escorted the employee to a motor vehicle 
and allowed him to drive away could be 
negligent." The Texas Supreme Court al-
lowed the suit because in their view the 
employer had "failed to exercise reason-
able care to avoid injury to third persons." 
(/d. slip op. at 7). 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in their opinion initially noticed the 
similarity between the appellants' cause of 
action and Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 
4 76 A.2d 1219 ( 1984), a case decided by 
the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey. After 
stating the issue of whether an employer 
who negligently "promotes and permits the 
intoxication of an employee at the employ-
er's premises during business hours and in 
the course of an employer's party, and know-
ingly allows the intoxicated employee to 
drive from his employment and negligently 
collide with and kill another" can be held 
liable, the court examined the line of cases 
preceding the Kelly holding. Kelly stood 
for the proposition in New Jersey that a host 
at a party could be liable to a third party for 
actions of "a person who was drunk and 
who subsequently, in a motor vehicle colli-
sion, negligently injured the third party." 
(/d. slip op. at 3). The court in the case at 
bar clearly rejected such an application of 
the Kelly holding in Maryland, stating that 
Kelly did not suddenly appear, but "was 
the end product of a progression of deci-
sions." /d. slip op. at 3. See Rappaport v. 
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); 
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 
582, 218 A.2d 630 ( 1966); Linn v. Rand, 
140 N.J.Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). 
The court continued that such an adoption 
would be "out-of-the-blue", and not war-
ranted because the general progression of 
cases preceding the Kelly decision in New 
Jersey, are not present in Maryland. Fur-
ther, Maryland has "not adopted Kelly nor 
has it seen fit, either judicially or legisla-
tively, to embrace a dram shop law action." 
See Felder v. Butler, 292 17 4, 438 A.2d 494 
( 1981 ); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 
A.2d 754 (1951); Fisherv. O'Connor's, Inc., 
53 Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982). 
Continuing, the court opined that Fisher 
had specifically rejected the New Jersey 
decision in Rappaport, 53 Md.App. at 
340, and that other jurisdictions shared 
the Maryland view. 
The court then examined the argument 
presented by the appellants regarding the 
"special relationship." Although the court 
acknowledged that the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel 
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 
(1986), and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 
236, 492 A.2d 1297 ( 1985), had adopted 
the principle that there is no liability to a 
third person absent a "special relationship" 
with a clear right to control, the court in 
Kuykendall found that there was "nothing 
in the matter sub judice to suggest that Top 
Notch had a right to control Wilke's ac-
tions after business hours." (/d. slip op. 
at 6). In applying settled Maryland case 
law, the court found a number of factors 
for not imposing liability on the employer, 
Top Notch. The court stated that "for an 
employer to be vicariously liable for the 
acts of an employee, the employee must be 
acting within the scope of his or her em-
ployment." Dhanraj v. Pepco, 305 Md. 
623, 506 A.2d 224 (1986); Watson v. 
Grimm, 200 Md. 461,90 A.2d 180 (1951). 
First, the court found that the appellants 
had not indicated in their complaint that 
Wilkes was acting within the scope of his 
employment when the collision occurred. 
Second, the accident took place off the 
business premises, after working hours, 
and Wilkes was operating his own vehicle. 
Third, the court reasoned since the party 
was not mandatory, the party could not 
have been furthering a business purpose of 
the employer, and therefore the employer 
could not be held vicariously liable for the 
acts of its employee, Wilkes. /d. slip op. 
at 7. 
When the court examined the second 
argument of the appellants it noted that 
Otis apparently followed a California case, 
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 
Cal.App. 2d 69, 70 Cal.Rptr. 136 (1968). 
The California court found that "affirma-
tive acts" of the employer, and ordering 
him to drive home "imposed a duty on the 
employer to exercise reasonable care." /d. 
slip op. at 8. The Court ofSpecial Appeals 
of Maryland then distinguished the Otis 
and Brockett cases, by examining Pinkham 
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387 
(Tex.App. 1985). Pinkham dealt with an 
employee at a company cookout. The 
court there in holding for Apple Com-
puter, Inc. found that the company did not 
take any affirmative acts. Similarly, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
found that Top Notch took no affirmative 
act with respect to Wilke's operation of a 
motor vehicle. /d. slip op. at 9. 
In addition to examining the appellants' 
arguments, the court examined the legisla-
tive intent in expressly not establishing a 
dram shop act. The court stated that the 
legislature, not the courts, should create 
such an act. The court pointed out that re-
cent annual meetings of the General As-
sembly had not deemed such an act neces-
sary. One explanation offered by the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland was the 
illogic of holding an employer liable when 
an employee voluntarily becomes intoxi-
cated and then injures a third party while 
liquor licensees, those in the business of 
dispensing alcoholic beverages, are not 
civilly liable to injured third persons. See 
Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 
494 (1981); Fisher v. O'Connor's, Inc., 53 
Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982). 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land has declined the opportunity to expand 
the law to allow the recovery of damages 
from employers under the circumstances 
of this case, which might have been called 
"The Employers' Dram Shop Law." The 
lack of an affirmative act by Top Notch, or 
a showing of vicarious liability by the ap-
pellants was decided by the court to leave 
the question of imposing such liability on 
employers in the hands of either the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in its role as "law giver". 
-Robert L. Kline, III 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Gilbert: ATTORNEY DISBARRED 
FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
MATERIAL INFORMATION ON 
HIS BAR APPLICATION 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Gilbert, 307 Md. 481, 515 A.2d 454 
( 1986), Gilbert was disbarred due to his 
failure to disclose, what the court con-
sidered, material information on his bar 
application. The court of appeals rendered 
this extreme sanction because of the seri-
ousness of Gilbert's misconduct, which re-
flected on his fitness to practice law. 
The nondisclosed item was Gilbert's 
answer to question ten on his 1980 ap-
plication. Question ten required: 
"a complete list of all suits in equity, 
actions at law, suits in bankruptcy or 
other statutory proceedings, matters 
in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and 
every other judicial or administrative 
proceedings of every nature and kind, 
except criminal proceedings to which 
I am or have ever been a party. (If 
'NONE' so state)." 
Gilbert at 457. 
The answer given was "NONE". In 
reality, Gilbert had filed a civil suit in the 
Circuit Court of Baltimore County on June 
4, 1970 to recover the benefits of two in-
surance policies on his wife's life, which he 
obtained three months prior to her mur-
der. The problem with the nondisclosure, 
which made it material, was that Gilbert 
was found in the civil trial to have had a 
part in the murder, consequently he was 
denied recovery. Specifically, Judge Proc-
tor, who heard the civil trial, commented 
in his opinion that "[T]he evidence is over-
whelming that Gilbert intentionally caused 
the death of his wife in order to reap the 
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harvest, namely the proceeds of these two 
life insurance policies .. . "Gilbert at 459. 
Afterwards Judge Raymond G. Thieme, 
Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County held evidentiary hearings pursuant 
to Md Rule BV9 and used Judge Proctor's 
findings to conclude that Gilbert purpose-
fully failed to disclose the civil suit and 
this nondisclosure was material so as to 
violate DR 1-lOl(a) and DR 1-102 & (4) of 
the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. A judge's factual findings are 
prima facie correct and will not be changed 
unless clearly erroneous. Attorney Griev-
ance Comm. v. Kemp 303 Md. 664, 674, 
496 A.2d 672 (1985). The court of appeals 
indicated that a person with a law degree 
should be able to read question ten as 
clearly asking for any and all involvement 
in civil litigation and dismissed Gilbert's 
claim that he had misread the question. 
Gilbert was not a novice with the court 
system as he had confrontations with the 
law on many occassions during a six month 
period in 1967. During this period, Gilbert 
"was charged with conspiracy to commit 
forgery, forgery and uttering, murder and 
accessory to murder, homicide and as-
sault." Gilbert at 455. Out of these charges 
he was adjudicated guilty for forgery and 
uttering and he was imprisoned between 
November 1970 and August 1972. Shortly 
after these charges, Gilbert was arrested 
for the murder of his wife on June 4, 1967. 
On March 13, 1969, Gilbert and his sister 
were indicted for murder and conspiracy 
to commit murder. When Gilbert's sister 
was acquitted, his charges were nol prossed 
on June 24, 1974. 
Gilbert finally graduated from law 
school in 1980 and completed the applica-
tion in question on May 20, 1980. Shortly 
thereafter, Gilbert's petition "for expunge-
ment of all the records associated with the 
nol prossed indictment for his wife's mur-
der" was granted on June 23, 1980. Gilbert 
at 455. He passed the July 1980 Bar Ex-
amination and the next step was the char-
acter investigation to determine a can-
didate's present moral fitness to practice 
law in Maryland. 
The initial committee (character com-
mittee of the third judicial circuit), on Oc-
tober 21, 1980, recommended unanimously 
not to grant admission. The State Board of 
Law Examiners, pursuant to Rule 4c, con-
cluded by a 3-2 vote that Gilbert be ad-
mitted since he had the present moral char-
acter fitness to practice law. The weight 
used in these proceedings is clear and con-
vincing evidence. See In re Application of 
James G., 296 Md. 310,462 A.2d 1198 
(1983). In that case, the court looked at 
Gilbert's hardships through the years in-
cluding "the birth of a Down's Syndrome 
28-The Law Forum/Spring, 1987 
child during his first marriage and the fact 
that his first wife [was murdered]." Gz1bert 
at 485. In determining his present moral 
character, the court noted that the history 
of criminal action occurred 16 years ago 
and was within a six month period. Also, 
the murder charge was nol prossed, and 
since 1981 Gilbert had practiced in the 
District of Columbia without incident. 
However, when the civil suit came to the 
attention of the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission (AGC), they conducted evidentiary 
hearings and filed a petition for disciplinary 
action. Gilbert insisted his nondisclosure 
was neither purposeful or material. Judge 
Thieme thought otherwise for the follow-
ing reasons: Gilbert's contention that the 
application was done in haste was discounted 
because by looking at the dates of his sig-
natures it was determined that at least 
three days transpired before the application 
was submitted and the non disclosure of 
the civil suit was purposeful because Gil-
bert had many opportunities to provide 
this information, but did not. 
The court of appeals found the context of 
the word "material" as used in DR 1-10 l(a) 
had never been previously defined in 
Maryland. The court used several anal-
ogies to other areas of law such as sum-
mary judgment-"whether the resolution 
of any material matter of fact may affect 
the outcome of the case," King v. Bankered 
303 Md 98, 111, 492 A.2d 688 ( 1985); and 
insurance- an "ommission" is material ifit 
would affect the insurer's decision about 
providing insurance or evaluating the risk." 
Maryland Indemnity v. Steers, 221 Md. 
380, 385, 157 A.2d 803 ( 1960). The court 
decided to adopt the definition that the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota applied 
in In re Howe, 257 N.W. 2d 420 (N.D. 
1977), which dealt with the same rule as 
the case at bar. Their definition of a mate-
rial omission is one that "has the effect of 
inhibiting the efforts of the bar to deter-
mine an applicant's fitness to practice 
law." Id. at 422. Overall, the various stan-
dards reflect on how the decision-making 
process is affected by a particular fact or 
representation. 
The court held that the nondisclosure of 
the civil suit enabled Gilbert to use his ex-
pungement in a self-serving manner that 
"plainly inhibited efforts to assess Gilbert's 
present moral character fitness to practice 
law." Gilbert at 460. Therefore, the omis-
sion was clearly material. Gilbert relied on 
In reApplication of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 
439 A.2d 1107 (1982) where there was 
nondisclosure of a criminal conviction. 
However, that case is easily distinguishable 
because G.L.S. volunteered additional in-
formation during the admission process 
unlike Gilbert. 
Gilbert's other contentions were also 
found to have no validity. Gilbert asserted 
that the civil suit had no bearing on the dis-
ciplinary proceedings, but the court ruled 
it was relevant in determining whether the 
omission was deliberate which has a direct 
bearing on one's present moral character. 
Gilbert also complained that his mother, 
father and a witness from his earlier trial 
should have been allowed to testify at the 
hearing. However, the witness' veracity 
was not at issue so his testimony was prop-
erly excluded. The only testimony allowed 
from Gilbert's parents was what state of 
mind Gilbert had as he worked on the ap-
plication and at no other time. Further-
more, Gilbert contends that the disciplin-
ary hearings had the effect of convicting 
him of his wife's murder thereby denying 
him due process of law. However, this is 
misplaced because the findings did not 
determine guilt or innocence, but only had 
a bearing on his fitness to practice law. 
Thus, the court of appeals has provided 
some guidelines as to what they consider a 
material omission on a bar application. If 
this omission reflects on a candidates truth-
fulness and candor, which is the most im-
portant character qualification, AGC v. 
Levitt, 286 Md. 238, 406 A.2d 1298 (1979), 
then strong disciplinary action will be called 
for. To determine if a purposefully dis-
honest omission or misrepresentation re-
quires disbarment as the proper sanction, 
the court will mainly look to the severity of 
the misconduct and any compelling exten-
uating circumstances. 
-Robert Feldman 
Department of Natural Resources v. 
Welsh: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
DID NOT BAR ACTION TO 
QUIET TITLE 
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that: ( 1) sovereign im-
munity did not bar action to quiet title 
based on the Department of Natural Re-
sources' allegedly unconstitutional taking, 
and (2) that the department had not ac-
quired interest in land belonging to plain-
tiff's predecessors, who had not been 
named as parties in earlier condemnation 
proceeding. Dep't. of Natural Resources v. 
Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 517 A.2d 722 (1986). 
As a result of this decision, the Rocky Gap 
State Park in Allegany County has lost a 
thirty three acre tract of land. 
In 1983, W. Mitchell Welsh brought 
suit against the Department of Natural 
Resources to quiet title to land. Appar-
ently, in 1966, the department obtained ti-
tle to a 1,000 acre tract in Allegany County 
through a condemnation proceeding. The 
